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RETHINKING REVERSE LOCATION 
SEARCH WARRANTS 
Mohit Rathi* 
The conflict between personal liberty and collective security has 
challenged Americans throughout the ages. The reverse location search 
warrant, which provides police officers with the ability to access location 
information on every smartphone that passes within a certain radius around 
a crime scene, is the newest chapter in this conflict. This technology is 
relatively new, but it is slowly being adopted by technologically savvy police 
departments across the country. While the reverse location search warrant 
could help officers catch and prevent crimes, the technology comes at the 
cost of providing police departments with unprecedented access to the 
location information of individuals that might not have otherwise satisfied 
traditional probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment. 
This Comment first seeks to provide a high-level explanation of the 
reverse location search warrant, including the process by which this type of 
warrant is served to judges. It then discusses the role of Google, the primary 
provider of location information, in cooperating with law enforcement. Next, 
it outlines the technical and constitutional concerns created through the use 
of reverse location search warrants, specifically addressing concerns around 
the accuracy of Google’s location information data, judges’ ability to 
meaningfully review these warrants, and potential Fourth Amendment 
challenges that reverse location search warrants might face. It next discusses 
the benefits that reverse location search warrants might provide to police 
departments across the country, including connecting otherwise seemingly 
disparate crimes and providing defense attorneys with location information 
they can use to protect their clients. Finally, this Comment proposes that the 
judiciary create an emergency exception to the probable cause framework in 
order to analyze reverse location search warrants. This exception is 
necessary because these search warrants raise unique technological and 
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constitutional issues that are difficult to analyze under the probable cause 
framework. Alternatively, this Comment provides three common-sense 
legislative solutions which, if adopted, would help limit the privacy impact 
that reverse location search warrants could have on citizens across the 
country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From Orwell to The Hunger Games, the concept of a dystopian world 
where every citizen’s actions are monitored and reported has been a part of 
our society’s subconscious for the past few decades. There is a growing sense 
of fear among many people that the same technological changes that have 
drastically improved our lifespan and productivity might also bring about the 
end of privacy as we know it.1 This Comment examines one such 
technological change being adopted by local and federal law enforcement 
agencies across the country: the reverse location search warrant. This type of 
warrant allows police officers to request cell phone location information from 
any mobile device within a certain radius of a crime scene at the time the 
crime occurred. 
This powerful new technology has the potential to make our lives safer 
by helping law enforcement catch dangerous criminals, but it also provides 
law enforcement with unprecedented discretion in accessing private location 
information. As is so often the case with crime-solving technology, the 
question is not whether reverse location search warrants will become more 
common, but when they will. In light of this new technology, it is important 
to consider what can be done to protect fundamental privacy concerns. 
More specifically, the reverse location search warrant has the potential 
to erode the Fourth Amendment protection from warrants that lack probable 
cause. Currently, courts use the probable cause framework when analyzing 
warrants, but reverse location search warrants present unique technological 
and constitutional issues that are more difficult to analyze under traditional 
probable cause analysis. Accordingly, this Comment argues that courts 
should move away from the probable cause framework, at least within the 
context of reverse location search warrants, to ensure that they can 
adequately protect fundamental privacy concerns. If courts are unwilling to 
do so, then federal and state legislatures should adopt new laws and 
regulations to ensure that reverse location search warrants are defined 
 
 1 See, e.g., Lew McCreary, What Was Privacy?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2008), 
https://hbr.org/2008/10/what-was-privacy [https://perma.cc/Q68T-YWX9]; Marc Groman, As 
Technology Advances, What Will Happen With Online Privacy?, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2019/01/15/as-technology-advances-what-will-happen-
with-online-privacy/#421c69af1c45 [https://perma.cc/XHS2-3LZW]; Charlie Warzel, 
Opinion, We No Longer Expect Privacy. You Can Change That, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/opinion/privacy-tips.html [https://perma.cc/ULN8-YY
EH]. 
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narrowly and that judges have adequate information when deciding whether 
to approve these warrants. 
Part I of this Comment provides background information on reverse 
location search warrants and the process police officers use to request them. 
It also analyzes the role of Google, the primary provider of detailed location 
information in the modern landscape, in cooperating with law enforcement 
agencies. Part II outlines technical concerns raised by reverse location search 
warrants, especially with regards to the judicial approval process, and 
discusses the potential societal benefits of adopting reverse location search 
warrant technology. Part III discusses Fourth Amendment “probable cause” 
jurisprudence broadly, as well as the constitutional challenges reverse-
location search warrants are likely to face in coming years. Part IV proposes 
creating an exception to Fourth Amendment probable cause jurisprudence in 
the context of reverse location search warrants, before finally suggesting 
three common-sense legislative proposals that could collectively limit these 
warrants’ impact on privacy rights. 
I. REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE ROLE OF GOOGLE 
The reverse location search warrant is a relatively new technology 
employed by police officers to catch criminals using the location information 
stored on criminals’ phones. This Part of the Comment will provide 
background information on the reverse location search warrant, including a 
high-level description of the technology and how police officers use it. It will 
then describe the role of Google, the primary provider of location information 
for reverse location search warrants, in cooperating with law enforcement 
agencies across the country. Lastly, this Part will address Google’s response 
to privacy concerns and its efforts to push back against overly broad requests 
from law enforcement. 
A. HOW REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS WORK 
Since at least 2017, law enforcement officers across the country have 
been using reverse location search warrants.2 Rather than targeting a specific 
person, reverse location search warrants target location information pulled 
from mobile devices within a specified location.3 This technology is gaining 
prominence partially due to the efforts of a corporation, ZetX, which travels 
 
 2 Aaron Mak, Close Enough: Police Departments Are Using “Reverse Location Search 
Warrants” to Force Google to Hand over Data on Anyone Near a Crime Scene, SLATE: 
FUTURE TENSE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/02/reverse-location-searc
h-warrants-google-police.html [https://perma.cc/K7AW-AF9Y]. 
 3 See id. 
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around the country promoting its new software, Trax, to local law 
enforcement agencies.4 Trax “recognizes cell phone data in any format from 
any provider and uses it to map the cell towers, create visuals of call 
information, [and] highlight callers’ habits.”5 Once law enforcement installs 
this software, Trax can even automatically fill out search warrants: police 
officers simply select the area where the crime occurred on a map, and the 
longitudinal coordinates of the crime scene automatically populate directly 
into the warrant.6 This technology, combined with corporations such as 
Google’s extensive location tracking, makes it easier for law enforcement to 
request more reverse location search warrants. 
Reverse location search warrants are typically split into two or three 
smaller warrant requests.7 In the first warrant, law enforcement requests 
location data from a company—almost always Google.8 That company 
provides location information from the smartphone of everyone who has 
come within a set distance of the crime scene.9 This information is 
anonymous at first.10 Once law enforcement officers narrow down the list of 
potential suspects based on the individual movement patterns revealed by the 
initial data, they request a second warrant to acquire more details, including 
the names and account information of any suspects.11 The way Google 
obtains this information depends on the type of phone a suspect uses.12 
Google obtains this information from Android phones directly; for other 
smartphones, Google obtains this information through its applications, such 
 
 4 See Merrin Overbeck, Constitutionality of Cell Site Location Information Use, UNIV. 
RICH. J. L. & TECH. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://jolt.richmond.edu/2019/09/09/constitutionality-of-
cell-site-location-information-use/ [https://perma.cc/U5L5-48HE]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Melanie Basich, Trax from Zetx: Visual Analysis, POLICE MAG. (July 17, 2014), 
https://www.policemag.com/341174/trax-from-zetx-visual-analysis [https://perma.cc/T82E-
SDPK]. 
 7 Daniel K. Gelb, Is the Reverse Location Search Warrant Heading in the Wrong 
Direction?, 34 CRIM. JUST. 68, 68 (2019). 
 8 Google is the only company that has admitted to having the technological capability to 
perform these searches. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a 
Dragnet for the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/int
eractive/2019/04/13/us/google-location-tracking-police.html [https://perma.cc/9BMZ-A8PX] 
[hereinafter Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones]. 
 9 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault Is a Boon for Law Enforcement. This 
Is How It Works., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/04/13/technology/google-sensorvault-location-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/5T8H-395W] 
[hereinafter Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See Mak, supra note 2. 
810 RATHI [Vol. 111 
as Gmail, Chrome, or Google Maps.13 Google derives location information 
from GPS tracking instead of cell-site location information (CSLI), which 
the Supreme Court has held requires a showing of probable cause to access.14 
GPS location tracking derives location information from mobile devices 
directly instead of triangulating their position based on cell phone towers; as 
such, it provides more accurate and detailed information than CSLI.15 
The collected GPS information is then loaded into Google’s platform 
for hosting location data, Sensorvault, which Google also uses for targeted 
advertising.16 For instance, Google uses Sensorvault to check if a person 
physically entered a store he or she viewed advertisements for online and 
then reports back to the store about whether the advertisement they purchased 
was effective.17 It is possible to opt out of sharing location information with 
Google in this way;18 however, Google prompts users to re-enable 
Sensorvault when setting up applications such as Google Maps or even 
regular Google searches with location enabled.19 Thus, it is difficult for 
Google users to avoid having their location information collected. 
Law enforcement has employed the reverse location search warrant in 
multiple jurisdictions.20 Police departments in Raleigh, North Carolina; 
Orange County, California; and Minnesota have all used this technology in 
the last two years.21 The reverse location search warrant’s growing use raises 
serious Fourth Amendment concerns, as people can be searched through the 
first warrant22 simply because they walked near a crime scene, which may 
not satisfy traditional probable cause analysis.23 As explained further infra,24 
the reverse location search warrant arguably puts the cart before the horse 
 
 13 See id. 
 14 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (holding that the requirement 
for probable cause for a search warrant extended to warrants involving CSLI). 
 15 Id. at 2219. 
 16 Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault, supra note 9. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Samuel Gibbs, How to Turn off Google’s Location Tracking, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/14/how-to-turn-off-google-locati
on-tracking [https://perma.cc/7CDJ-DQDQ]. 
 19 Valentino-DeVries, Google’s Sensorvault, supra note 9. 
 20 See Mak, supra note 2. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See George Joseph, Manhattan DA Got Innocent People’s Google Phone Data Through 
A ‘Reverse Location’ Search Warrant, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 12, 2019), https://gothamist.com/ne
ws/manhattan-da-got-innocent-peoples-google-phone-data-through-a-reverse-location-sear
ch-warrant [https://perma.cc/T6LM-JX29]. 
 23 See Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8. 
 24 Infra Part C. 
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through this first smaller warrant. While the second warrant in a reverse 
location search warrant might satisfy the probable cause framework, the first 
warrant has a much weaker justification because it is granted simply on the 
basis of an individual being near a crime scene. 
B. GOOGLE’S COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Google can lawfully provide law enforcement officials with customer 
location information through the third-party doctrine, a common law 
principle which states that people who voluntarily give up their information 
to third parties have “no reasonable expectation of privacy.”25 In the case of 
reverse location search warrants, the third party is typically Google, which 
receives up to 180 requests for location information from law enforcement 
per week.26 Under this doctrine, by agreeing to use location services, 
customers would likely be considered to have given up their location 
information to Google.27 Thus, consumers who opt into Google’s location 
services may have their information shared with the government. 
Law enforcement officers also send these requests to other tech 
corporations that store customer location information.28 One of Google’s 
competitors, Apple, maintains that it currently lacks the capability to provide 
law enforcement officers with easily digestible location information.29 At 
least outwardly, Apple’s approach to sharing geolocation data seems more 
 
 25 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly 
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on 
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed.”). The Supreme Court has applied this doctrine in a variety 
of contexts. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018); United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23 (1984). 
 26 Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8. 
 27 See Nathaniel Sobel, Do Geofence Warrants Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/do-geofence-warrants-violate-
fourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/ZLE3-THY4] (discussing one recent case that might 
resolve this question). 
 28 Charles Blain, Police Could Get Your Location Data Without a Warrant. That Has to 
End, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without
-warrant-end/ [https://perma.cc/YA5B-2V8H]. 
 29 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Google Could Be Bankrupting Apple’s Privacy Promises by 
Handing over iPhone Data to the Police, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.business
insider.com/google-bankrupting-apple-privacy-promises-by-handing-data-to-police-2019-4 
[https://perma.cc/5TYG-LEM2]. 
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consumer privacy-forward than Google’s.30 Apple’s public refusal to help the 
FBI break into the phone of Rizwan Farook, who, in 2015, carried out a 
shooting rampage that killed 14 people in San Bernadino, California, 
provides further support for this image.31 Apple stated that helping the FBI 
investigate Farook would “set a dangerous precedent” for the future.32 Apple 
appears to approve of the perception that it is more privacy-forward than 
Google, as it has released posters and advertisements mocking Google for its 
cooperation with law enforcement.33 
The two companies’ apparently differing stances on providing 
information to law enforcement might suggest that any needed change to 
location information sharing practices must come from individual 
corporations like Google. But despite its public persona, even Apple has 
provided the FBI with location data it possesses.34 In fact, it’s possible that 
the only reason Apple does not provide the same level of information to law 
enforcement as Google is because they lack the technological capability to 
do so.35 Indeed, given tech companies’ ever-increasing revenue from targeted 
advertisements,36 it may be only a matter of time before most or even all tech 
 
 30 Kate O’Flaherty, Apple Issues New Blow to Facebook and Google with this Bold 
Privacy Move, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/
11/06/apple-issues-new-blow-to-facebook-and-google-with-this-privacy-move/#4fff2
6d1481d [https://perma.cc/UG8C-S5CL]. But see Ian Bogost, Apple’s Empty Grandstanding 
About Privacy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2019/01/apples-hypocritical-defense-data-privacy/581680/ [https://perma.cc/3VCP-NJUS]. 
 31 Laura Wagner, The Apple-FBI Debate Over Encryption: FBI Says It May Be Able to 
Access Shooter’s iPhone Without Apple’s Help, NPR (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/21/471353161/fbi-says-it-may-be-able-to-access-shooters-
iphone-without-apples-help [https://perma.cc/82SH-9SSQ]. 
 32 Hamilton, supra note 30. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple, has written that “[w]hen the FBI has requested data that’s 
in our possession, we have provided it.” Id. 
 35 Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8 (investigators involved in using a 
reverse location search warrant told the New York Times that they had not sent other tech 
companies reverse location search warrant requests, and Apple said it did not have the 
capability to perform this kind of search). 
 36 Megan Graham, Digital Ad Revenue in the US Surpassed $100 Billion for the First Time 
in 2018  ̧CNBC (May 7, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/07/digital-ad-revenue-in-the-
us-topped-100-billion-for-the-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/4ZF3-NW95] (explaining that 
digital advertising revenue recently hit an all-time high and continues to grow at double-digit 
rates). 
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companies begin storing detailed location information and providing this 
information to law enforcement agencies.37 
C. GOOGLE’S RESPONSE TO PRIVACY CONCERNS 
In response to growing privacy concerns, Google now elects to provide 
consumers with details on the kinds of requests it receives from law 
enforcement and the types of data consumers are at risk of disclosing to law 
enforcement agencies.38 Google’s Privacy and Terms policy states that the 
company receives government requests for information directly, and in 
criminal cases it requires search warrants before disclosing the content of 
email communications, documents, and photos.39 Google also receives less 
extensive requests from law enforcement in the form of court orders.40 Like 
search warrants, these court orders typically require judicial review and can 
provide officers with information such as IP addresses or non-content 
portions of emails such as headers or timestamps.41 Google also states that in 
emergency cases, in order to prevent serious bodily harm or death, it 
voluntarily discloses user information to government agencies at its own 
discretion.42 
According to Google, it has made at least some strides in protecting 
users’ privacy from law enforcement. For example, Google has stated that it 
pushes back against overbroad requests from law enforcement by screening 
warrant requests for errors and by asking judges to amend warrants to be less 
broad in terms of both the time period and the applications law enforcement 
 
 37 But see Note, Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies in Government 
Surveillance, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1722 (2018) (discussing reasons tech companies might 
support privacy laws, namely “their patriotism and desire to maintain positive relationships 
with their regulators – even in the absence of appropriate legal process.”). But see Martin 
Kaste, Google Explains How it Handles Police Requests for Users’ Data, NPR (Jan. 28, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/2013/01/28/170428992/google-posts-how-it-handles-requests-for-users-
data [https://perma.cc/2272-CJDM] (stating that “[m]ost of the industry thinks tougher 
privacy law would be good for business, especially on cloud-based services”). 
 38 Legal Process for User Data Requests FAQs, GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP. HELP CTR., 
https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/answer/7381738?hl=en [https://perma.cc/M3S
K-JVZR] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 39 How Google Handles Government Requests for User Information, GOOGLE: PRIVACY 
& TERMS, https://policies.google.com/terms/information-requests [https://perma.cc/86DK-
424P] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (under “Requests for information made to Google LLC”) 
[hereinafter GOOGLE: PRIVACY & TERMS]. 
 40 GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP. HELP CTR., supra note 38. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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officers can access.43 Google also claims that it will notify any user whose 
information has been legally requested, unless such notifications are 
prohibited by law.44 As a recent example, in January, 2020, Google’s legal 
investigations team successfully notified a user in Gainesville, Florida that 
law enforcement had requested his location information.45 The man had been 
flagged as suspicious by a reverse location search warrant because he passed 
the scene of a burglary three times while looping around his neighborhood 
on his bike.46 
Law enforcement officials sometimes try to prevent companies from 
notifying users about these requests, arguing that these notifications might 
increase suspects’ flight risk.47 At law enforcement’s request, courts can add 
a “gag order” under 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) to these warrants.48 In practice, gag 
orders bar Google and other tech companies from notifying customers when 
the government requests their data.49 These gag orders can last indefinitely, 
and according to Mozilla’s chief legal officer, “When requesting user data, 
these gag orders are sometimes issued without the government demonstrating 
why the gag order is necessary.”50 Though tech giants have been pushing 
back against government gag orders through both the court system51 and 
creative technological solutions,52 the apparent lack of accountability around 
 
 43 Google, Way of a Warrant, YOUTUBE (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=MeKKHxcJfh0 [https://perma.cc/7K73-DYEA] (discussing the role of “producers,” 
specialists who alongside Google’s legal team examine warrants and work with investigators 
or judges to narrow down or amend overly broad warrants). 
 44 GOOGLE: PRIVACY & TERMS, supra note 39. 
 45 Jon Schuppe, Google Tracked His Bike Ride Past a Burglarized Home. That Made Him 
a Suspect  ̧MSNBC (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/google-tracked-
his-bike-ride-past-burglarized-home-made-him-n1151761 [https://perma.cc/AG9R-AW3K]. 
 46 Id. 
 47 John Ribeiro, Google, Apple, Twitter, in Large Groups Backing Microsoft over ‘Gag 
Orders’, IT WORLD (Sept. 4, 2016), https://www.itworld.com/article/3116325/google-apple-
twitter-in-large-group-backing-microsoft-over-gag-orders.html [https://perma.cc/DN7C-SV
PV]. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. Requests for gag orders are made so frequently that challenging the orders would be 
prohibitively expensive for tech companies. As such, the government can obtain gag orders 
without proper explanations or any accountability. See id.  
 51 Dave Lee, Microsoft Sues US Government Over Secret Data Requests, BBC (Apr. 14, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36050151 [https://perma.cc/V5XE-NZL9]. 
 52 Dan Gillmor, Google Can’t Tell You When the Government Wants Your Data. Here’s 
a Sneaky Solution., SLATE TECH. (Jan. 29, 2015), https://slate.com/technology/2015/01/warra
nt-canaries-a-way-for-tech-companies-to-get-around-government-gag-orders.html [https://pe
rma.cc/8TBY-W5TT] (explaining tech companies’ use of the “warrant canary,” a daily email 
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gag orders gives law enforcement wide discretion in applying 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2705.53 
Lastly, the Google Transparency Report lists the kinds of information 
Google typically discloses to law enforcement. The government can access 
email content, header information, sign-in IP addresses, and registration 
information through Gmail; sign-in IP addresses, registration information, 
video upload IP addresses, and private message content through YouTube; 
telephone records, billing information, registration information and IP 
addresses, stored text message content, and voicemails through Google 
Voice; and blog registration information, timestamps, IP addresses, and 
private comments through Blogger.54 To some degree, this non-location 
information is protected from reverse location search warrant requests 
because it must be requested through a second warrant, and the initial warrant  
should have only given law enforcement access to anonymized location 
information. Still, as explained further below, this protection is not absolute. 
Reverse location search warrants can lead to the distribution of innocent 
persons’ personal information to the police.  
II. REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS: CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS 
Like any new technology, reverse location search warrants present both 
challenges and benefits. This Part will address some of the technical 
challenges created by reverse location search warrants, including concerns 
related to the accuracy of Google’s data and potential problems with how 
reverse location search warrants are served to judges. It will then lay out 
potential societal benefits created by the use of reverse location search 
warrants. These benefits include helping police officers catch criminals more 
efficiently and providing defense attorneys with a wealth of location 
information that they might then use to prevent wrongful convictions. 
A. CHALLENGES POSED BY REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS 
There are many technical concerns relating to the technology law 
enforcement uses to obtain reverse location search warrants. These concerns 
include the fact that GPS coordinates, rather than physical maps, are typically 
provided to the judges who review reverse location search warrants, that 
location information in these warrants may be inaccurate, and that innocent 
 
service consumers can sign up for confirming that one’s data has not been requested by law 
enforcement. The daily email does not arrive on days when law enforcement did actually 
request data). 
 53 Ribeiro, supra note 47. 
 54 GOOGLE: PRIVACY & TERMS, supra note 39 (under “What kinds of information do you 
disclose for different products?”). 
816 RATHI [Vol. 111 
people’s data can be at risk when these warrants are too broad. These 
concerns, while often technological in nature, always link back to the Fourth 
Amendment, which requires that all search warrants are supported by 
probable cause.55 
1. How Reverse Location Search Warrants Are Served to Judges 
One pressing concern is the way in which reverse location search 
warrant requests are served to judges. Specifically, reverse location search 
warrants often include complex GPS coordinates instead of a physical map 
displaying the area the warrant intends to surveil.56 Police officers often map 
out the coordinates of the area they wish to survey within the Trax software 
(and related products such as Google Earth), but officers do not always 
provide these illustrations to judges, nor are they required to.57 In the words 
of ACLU attorney Nathan Freed Wessler, “Most human beings can’t 
interpret large strings of numbers and GPS coordinates without a map to 
illustrate them, and judges are no exception.”58 It seems unlikely that judges 
can accurately ascertain the size and physical features of the area they are 
authorizing for a search based on latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates 
alone, without a physical map to illustrate the buildings and general area 
covered by the reverse location search warrant. This is especially true in 
comparison to traditional search warrants, which typically authorize the 
search of a specific residence, computer, or person instead of an area 
generally.59 
The volume of unsynthesized data presented by reverse location search 
warrants is especially problematic in light of the fast turnaround times for 
 
 55 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 56 Tim Cushing, Minnesota Judges Spent Only Minutes Approving Warrants Sweeping Up 
Thousands of Cellphone Users, TECHDIRT (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20190211/08125241570/minnesota-judges-spent-only-minutes-approving-warrants-sweepi
ng-up-thousands-cellphone-users.shtml [https://perma.cc/HNJ6-AYYN]. 
 57 Tony Webster, How Did the Police Know You Were Near a Crime Scene? Google Told 
Them, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/02/07/google-
location-police-search-warrants [https://perma.cc/3LWR-Z9HV] (noting that only three of 
twenty-two warrants issued in Hennepin County, Minnesota included a map for the judges to 
visualize the area that the warrants encompassed). 
 58 Yves Smith, “Reverse Location Search Warrant”: A New Personal Data Hoovering 
Exercise Brought to You by Google, NAKED CAPITALISM (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.naked
capitalism.com/2019/02/reverse-location-search-warrant-a-new-personal-data-hoovering-
exercise-brought-to-you-by-google.html [https://perma.cc/X8H6-ALTJ]. 
 59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A). 
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search warrants in the modern era. A recent survey of public records60 
showed that most judges in Utah took less than three minutes to sign off on 
more than half of the warrants police had submitted over the period of a 
year.61 The same study showed that judges spent about eight minutes on 
average reviewing a warrant and denied only two percent of proposed 
warrants.62 Reviewing warrants so quickly can make meaningful review 
difficult, especially when complex technical information like longitudinal 
coordinates is involved. As one example, a judge in Edina, Minnesota 
reviewed a reverse location search warrant (which did not even include a map 
of the targeted area) for a maximum of four minutes before signing off on 
it.63 Reviewing the warrant for such a short period of time makes it unlikely 
that the judge could analyze both the rationale behind the warrant and the 
scope of the area he or she was permitting the police to survey, especially 
without a map.64 This concern is especially salient given that reverse location 
search warrants can cover a geographical area many times wider than 
traditional crime scenes, and a judge might have no idea that he or she signed 
off on a search of such a wide area.65 
2. Concerns Related to Accuracy and Effectiveness 
Reverse location search warrants also raise legitimate concerns related 
to the effectiveness and accuracy of location information. Research has 
shown that under some conditions, Google overestimates its own accuracy 
with regards to the exact location of a user ninety-three percent of the time.66 
Indeed, according to a 2018 forensic sciences study published by the U.S. 
National Library of Medicine, Google could only accurately ascertain that a 
device was somewhere within a fifty-two meter radius.67 In tightly packed 
 
 60 Conner Boyack, Is the Warrant System Working Well?, LIBERTAS INST. (June 6, 2019), 
https://libertasutah.org/justice-and-due-process/is-the-warrant-system-working-well/ 
[https://perma.cc/K8T2-J36Y]. 
 61 Jessica Miller, New Data Show Utah Judges Are Often Spending Less than Three 
Minutes Viewing Warrants Before Approval, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 9, 2018), https://www.sl
trib.com/news/2018/01/14/warrants-approved-in-just-minutes-are-utah-judges-really-reading
-them-before-signing-off/ [https://perma.cc/A78F-UBSR]. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Cushing, supra note 56. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Webster, supra note 57. 
 66 Smith, supra note 58. 
 67 Id.; for the study, see Andrea Marcellus Rodriguez, Christian Tiberius, Roel van Bree, 
Zeno Geradst, Google Timeline Accuracy Assessment and Error Prediction, U.S. NAT’L 
LIBRARY OF MED. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6201806/ 
[https://perma.cc/55HG-EEFL]. 
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urban environments such as metropolitan cities, fifty-two meters can mean 
the difference between being directly at the scene of a crime and at home 
asleep a few floors upstairs. And because judges may grant a second, more 
extensive, search warrant on the basis of suspicious location movements 
tracked during the first warrant,68 inaccurate location information pulled in 
response to the first warrant could lead to innocent parties having their 
information shared with the police, raising significant privacy concerns. 
Similarly problematic is the fact that, as the technology used to generate 
reverse location search warrants becomes more widely known, professional 
criminals might learn to opt out of location sharing services, leave their 
cellular devices at home during crimes, or stop using smart phones entirely. 
Google allows users to clear their Google Maps history,69 and criminals 
might be more likely to use this feature because they have something to hide. 
On the other hand, innocent people, who have nothing to hide from law 
enforcement, might not adopt the same precautions. Thus, if professional 
criminals are able to effectively dodge reverse location search warrants, the 
use of these warrants could drive up the number of wrongful arrests in 
criminal cases and even result in wrongful convictions. 
This risk of increasing wrongful convictions is sobering, especially 
given the United States’ already high rate of wrongful convictions.70 
Moreover, wrongful convictions disproportionately victimize Black 
people.71 Studies show, for example, that Black people wrongfully convicted 
of crimes like murder must wait longer to be exonerated compared to their 
white counterparts.72 In this way, reverse location search warrants may have 
troubling implications for racial justice. To accurately ascertain whether the 
risk of wrongful convictions would increase over time because of reverse 
location search warrants, further research must be conducted. 
 
 68 See Gelb, supra note 7, at 68. 
 69 Andrew Martonik, How to Clear Search and Location History in Google Maps on 
Android, ANDROIDCENTRAL (July 26, 2019), https://www.androidcentral.com/how-clear-
search-and-location-history-google-maps-android [https://perma.cc/93SF-8Y3J]. 
 70 Samuel Gross, The Staggering Number of Wrongful Convictions in America, WASH. 
POST (July 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-cost-of-convicting-the-
innocent/2015/07/24/260fc3a2-1aae-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html [https://perma.cc/
FLM6-Y2VA] (citing studies that show up to 4.1% of defendants sentenced to death might be 
wrongfully convicted). 
 71 Niraj Chokshi, Black People More Likely to Be Wrongfully Convicted of Murder, Study 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/us/wrongful-conv
ictions-race-exoneration.html [https://perma.cc/XAN9-E7S9]. 
 72 Id. 
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3. The Collection of Innocent People’s Data 
Even if reverse location search warrants do not lead to an increase in 
wrongful convictions, at the very least, this technology could result in the 
collection of many innocent people’s data. Police departments often request 
location information tracked hours before and after a crime and from areas 
much larger than the crime scene itself.73 Once police close the case, the 
location data collected, as well as any other information brought up during 
the course of the second warrant, could become part of the case file whether 
accurate or not.74 Case files become part of the public record, and for this 
reason, details about innocent individuals’ locations could become subject to 
public scrutiny.75 
Because Trax is so new, case files involving investigations where police 
have used this technology are still largely open and thus unavailable to the 
public.76 Cause for concern is growing, however, as once these records 
become available to the public77 or get leaked, the tracked location 
information could become subject to scrutiny from the press. This scenario 
is not unprecedented. An innocent man in Minnesota who drove a cab within 
170 feet of a crime scene had his name released to a local journalist after it 
become part of the police record.78 Furthermore, there is a risk of police 
officers themselves accessing location data once it becomes part of a criminal 
file. This access opens up the potential for abuse of power by malicious law 
enforcement officers who can find people’s home addresses and daily 
schedules, among other information.79 
 
 73 Smith, supra note 58 (stating that one query made by the federal government covered a 
total area of 45 hectares, or 111 acres). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Contra 5 U.S.C. § 552 (stating The Freedom of Information Act would protect against 
any requested location information which fell under the personal privacy exemption, but the 
location information would remain on police systems). 
 76 Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8. For one example of a legal 
challenge against reverse location search warrants currently in the court system, see Tim 
Cushing, Reverse Warrant Used in Robbery Investigation Being Challenged as 
Unconstitutional, TECHDIRT (July 10, 2020), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200709/131
85544875/reverse-warrant-used-robbery-investigation-being-challenged-as-unconstitutional.
shtml [https://perma.cc/B9FS-XRJK]; see also Sobel, supra note 27. 
 77 Paul Grabowicz, Police Records, BERKELEY GRADUATE SCH. OF JOURNALISM, 
ADVANCED MEDIA INST., https://multimedia.journalism.berkeley.edu/tutorials/police-records/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZTH2-PNR9] (discussing the process by which police records become 
available to the public or reporters and how it can vary state by state). 
 78 Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8. 
 79 Charles Blain, Police Could Get Your Location Data Without a Warrant. That Has to 
End, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without
-warrant-end [https://perma.cc/9FM7-HHDA]. 
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A final privacy concern related to information collected by law 
enforcement is that it could be collected or hacked by malicious third parties. 
One recent data breach incident involving the Los Angeles Police 
Department resulted in “the personal information of at least 20,000 people” 
being shared with malicious hackers.80 Despite law enforcement agencies’ 
efforts to prevent leaks and abuse by officers, the sheer amount of data 
processed in reverse location search warrants makes the likelihood of error 
and serious harm to innocent people an ever-present danger. 
B. SOCIETAL BENEFITS CREATED BY REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH 
WARRANTS 
Despite these drawbacks, reverse location search warrants could also 
create benefits, both for law enforcement agencies and for the constituencies 
they police. By providing law enforcement officers with a visual 
representation of detailed location information for hundreds of people near a 
crime scene, reverse location search warrants can help law enforcement solve 
crimes and even connect otherwise seemingly disparate crimes. Location 
information in the hands of skilled defense attorneys also has the potential to 
exonerate innocent suspects and prevent wrongful convictions from 
occurring in the first place. 
1. Solving Crimes 
The primary benefit of the reverse location search warrant is its potential 
to solve crimes and catch criminals. The reverse location search warrant 
provides law enforcement agencies with detailed, anonymized location 
information for everyone who passes within a certain distance of the scene 
of a crime.81 Police officers can use this wealth of information to find people 
with suspicious location histories. For example, they might discover a person 
who went to a local gun store the day before passing in front of the scene of 
a shooting. They can then in turn use this information to request a second 
warrant, gathering more detailed information on the potential suspect.82  
Law enforcement agencies are already using these warrants to arrest 
suspects in certain jurisdictions. In Virginia, authorities arrested a suspect for 
 
 80 Zak Doffman, Cyberattack on LAPD Confirmed: Data Breach Impacts Thousands of 
Officers, FORBES (July 30, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/30/lapd-
cyberattack-police-department-confirms-it-has-been-hacked/#55251e5a14be [https://perma.c
c/K56K-YNPH] (discussing a data breach where the names, dates of birth, email addresses, 
passwords, and even the last four digits of social security numbers for over 17,500 police 
applicants and 2,500 police officers were collected by hackers and potentially put up for sale). 
81 Mak, supra note 2. 
82 Id.  
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robbing a bank based on the results of a reverse location search warrant sent 
to Google.83 Examples such as this show the crime-fighting potential of the 
tool. Prosecutors and police officers assert that the tool has also proved 
helpful in “solving crimes such as pattern burglaries, arsons, and sexual 
assaults.”84 
While the crime-solving potential of this technology is clear, it may be 
difficult for certain law enforcement agencies to reap the benefits of reverse 
location search warrants. Urban areas, in particular, provide law enforcement 
agencies using reverse location search warrants with a special challenge. This 
is because a warrant for even a relatively small area in a metropolitan center 
(e.g., Times Square) might collect a huge number of people’ information, 
making it more difficult for law enforcement officials to home in on 
suspects.85 On the other hand, police departments in urban areas also tend to 
be larger and better funded than police departments in rural areas.86 Thus, 
they may be well-positioned to use reverse location search warrants 
effectively.87 For instance, larger bureaucracy and support staff presence at 
urban police departments can provide police officers with better 
implementation and integration of crime-mapping software.88 Furthermore, 
larger police departments might be more likely to involve crime analytics 
staff in the use of crime-mapping technology like reverse location search 
 
83 Wendy Davis, Law Enforcement is Using Location Tracking on Mobile Devices 
to Identify Suspects, But is it Unconstitutional?, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2020) https://w
ww.abajournal.com/magazine/article/law-enforcement-is-using-location-tracking-
on-mobile-devices-to-identify-suspects-geofence [https://perma.cc/S3F5-DKLS].  
84 Id. On the other hand, it is unclear exactly how helpful the tool is when 
compared when traditional policing methods. 
 85 Andrew Perrin, Digital Gap Between Rural and Nonrural America Persists, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (May 31, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/31/digital-gap-betwee
n-rural-and-nonrural-america-persists/ [https://perma.cc/4N5F-6ZML]. 
 86 Shako Liu & Phil McClausland, Rural Police Struggle to Recruit Amid Poor Pay and 
Public Perception, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2019) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/rur
al-police-struggle-recruit-amid-poor-pay-public-perception-n1078496 [https://perma.cc/3SJ
N-A2V9] (urban areas tend to pay police officers better and be better staffed compared to rural 
areas, which have difficulties “acquiring up-to-date law enforcement resources and technology 
as they grapple with budget shortfalls.”). 
 87 See generally KEVIN STROM, NAT. CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., RESEARCH ON THE 
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON POLICING STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, FINAL REPORT 
SERVICE (Sept. 2017), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251140.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F2VN-FTQS] (discussing how technology might positively impact policing strategy in the 
coming years). 
 88 Id. at 4–6. 
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warrants. This specialized staff is often tech savvy and in a better position to 
assess the accuracy of mapping results than patrolling officers.89 
Currently, adequate research into the effectiveness of reverse location 
search warrants is lacking.90 Still, other crime-mapping solutions such as 
“hot-spot policing” and “risk-terrain modeling” have been shown to produce 
measurable benefits in urban municipalities through crime reduction.91 
Reverse location search warrants could provide similar benefits by making it 
easier for police officers to connect and solve seemingly disparate crimes. 
And providing police officers with the technology to connect disparate 
crimes could increase public safety and welfare by increasing law 
enforcement’s ability to catch repeat criminals. 
 
2. Preventing Wrongful Convictions 
As discussed above, reverse location search warrants could expose 
innocent people to criminal liability in certain circumstances. But location 
information could also exonerate innocent suspects by proving their location 
during the time of the crime.92 Law enforcement’s gathering of detailed 
location information through mobile devices around crime scenes could 
actually help defense attorneys, who could use location information collected 
during discovery to exonerate innocent suspects who might not otherwise be 
able to prove their location at the time of the crime. Indeed, ZetX’s own 
management team at one point listed shareability of information with defense 
counsel during the discovery process as one of the benefits of Trax.93 
One well-funded public defender’s office in New York has already 
tested whether location information might be useful to its clients.94 The office 
purchased a laboratory full of digital forensics equipment and then provided 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 4–5. 
 91 Id. “Hot-spot policing” is a reactive strategy that deploys police officers to areas where 
crime is already most concentrated. “Risk-terrain modeling,” which is more forward thinking, 
uses risk modeling to make future deployment decisions. Examples of better outcomes include 
reduced numbers of reported incidents or and reduced instances of observed physical and 
social disorder. 
 92 For example, one man in New Haven, Connecticut, was recently exonerated from a 
murder and robbery conviction on the basis of previously hidden cell-site location information. 
See Kathleen McWilliams, New Haven Man Jailed For 17 Years Freed after Judge Vacates 
Murder, Robbery Convictions, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.courant.co
m/breaking-news/hc-br-vernon-horn-released-wrongful-conviction-20180425-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/KZ7Y-BSKC]. 
 93 Basich, supra note 6. 
 94 Kashmir Hill, Imagine Being on Trial. With Exonerating Evidence Trapped on Your 
Phone., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/business/law-
enforcement-public-defender-technology-gap.html [https://perma.cc/3L5L-4P5D]. 
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location information on one client’s Google phone as an alibi.95 This led to 
the assistant district attorney dismissing the case against that client.96 
Similarly, a defense attorney in Gainesville, Florida recently used Google’s 
location data to vindicate a client investigated on the basis of a reverse 
location search warrant.97 These examples show how location information 
can be used by defense counsel to prove the innocence of suspects. 
However, at the moment, public defenders and other defense attorneys 
often lack access to location information and other resources used by 
government prosecutors because it can be so expensive to pull information 
from a suspect’s phone.98 Because location information is so expensive to 
capture, the discovery process for a case involving a reverse location search 
warrant could allow defense attorneys to determine their own client’s 
location and movements at a much lower cost. Eventually, widespread 
adoption of the technology around reverse location search warrants could 
lead to lower prices and greater accessibility to personal location 
information, allowing defense lawyers to better protect their clients. 
III. POTENTIAL FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO REVERSE 
LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS 
Reverse location search warrants are likely to face a multitude of legal 
challenges as they become a mainstream tool used by law enforcement 
agencies. A primary vehicle for these challenges will likely be the Fourth 
Amendment, which states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or things to be searched.”99 Specifically, 
opponents may argue that reverse location search warrants do not satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement as it is traditionally 
understood. This Part will outline the history of the Fourth Amendment and 
discuss reverse location search warrants’ similarities to problematic 
“general” warrants. Next, it will review recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
relating to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement and discuss 
whether reverse location search warrants satisfy this requirement. 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Schuppe, supra note 45. 
 98 Hill, supra note 94 (discussing how equipment that analyzes location information costs 
around $100,000 – “a fortune in a public defender’s budget”). 
 99 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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A. REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS AS “GENERAL 
WARRANTS” 
One of the potential challenges reverse location search warrants might 
face is that they are strikingly similar to the overly broad English general 
warrants which the Fourth Amendment was drafted to ban.100 These general 
warrants were authorized by either the King or the courts, and “lack[ed] 
particularity regarding the person or place to be searched, or the papers or 
records to be seized.”101 At the time, some English and American writers 
considered general warrants to be the height of tyranny because they gave 
officers an incredible amount of discretion in deciding where and whom to 
investigate.102 General warrants went so far as to allow officers to enter a 
house without a warrant if they were searching for a felon, which would have 
been condemned under common law at the time.103 The solution to these 
concerns was the Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrants satisfy a 
“probable cause” standard before a judge signs them.104 
Reverse location search warrants might be analogized to general 
warrants because both lack specificity with regards to the person or place to 
be searched. By not requiring police officers to have probable cause against 
any of the individual people they are searching before requesting location 
information, reverse location search warrants arguably recreate the exact 
issue the Framers were trying to prevent. Thus, from an originalist 
perspective, reverse location search warrants might circumvent the Framers’ 
intentions behind the Fourth Amendment. 
B. LOCATION INFORMATION & PROBABLE CAUSE 
While an originalist challenge against reverse location search warrants 
is possible, arguments against the constitutionality of this technology will 
likely focus more on whether it satisfies probable cause. In Brinegar v. 
United States, the Court stated that probable cause must be “more than bare 
 
 100 Thomas Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 
551 (1999); see also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (“Vivid in the memory of 
the newly independent Americans were those general warrants known as writs of assistance 
under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists.”). 
 101 Id.; see also Henry Farrell, America’s Founders Hated General Warrants. So Why Has 
the Government Resurrected Them? WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/14/americas-founders-hated-general-warrants-so-
why-has-the-government-resurrected-them/ [https://perma.cc/KUQ2-SPA2]. 
 102 Davies, supra note 100, at 689–91 (discussing writings of James Otis, who “denounced 
general writs of assistance as a violation of American liberties” and John Adams, who wrote 
an abstract of Otis’s argument that “[r]eason and the constitution are both against this writ”). 
 103 Id. at 578. 
 104 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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suspicion.”105 Instead, probable cause exists when a reasonable person acting 
on reasonably trustworthy information would have believed that based on the 
facts and circumstances of the case, the offense had been committed.106 This 
standard leaves breathing room for some law enforcement error through the 
“reasonable” qualifier. 107 
More recently, in Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that one of the goals of the Framers was to “place obstacles in the 
way of a too permeating police surveillance.”108 The Carpenter Court 
explained that the preservation of the Fourth Amendment required protection 
from the encroachments of advancing technology, specifically cell-site 
location information.109 As such, the Court held that the government must 
“obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such 
records;” it could not simply request the information through a court order.110 
The Court further stated that probable cause typically requires some level of 
“individualized suspicion.”111 Accordingly, law enforcement needed more 
than a court order to request personal location information under the Fourth 
Amendment because the showing required to get a court order did not reach 
the level of probable cause.112 
The Supreme Court decision in Carpenter specifically concerned 
whether or not a warrant was required in the context of cell-site location 
information (CSLI).113 The case arose when the government requested CSLI 
for suspected accomplices to a robbery and used this information to prove 
that the suspects were at or near the crime scene during the time of the 
robbery.114 The CSLI referred to in Carpenter is created through cell phones 
pinging nearby radio antennas, which are called cell sites.115 While the Court 
made it clear that the government must generally show probable cause in 
 
 105 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (holding that “[p]robable 
cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”) 
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018). 
 109 Id. at 2223. 
 110 Id. at 2221. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 2208–09. 
 114 Id. at 2212–13. 
 115 Id. at 2208–09. 
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order to receive CSLI,116 the Court has yet to indicate whether this reasoning 
extends to GPS location information.117 However, Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence in United States v. Jones, where the Court similarly considered 
location data, seems to at least suggest that law enforcement agencies would 
need warrants (and in turn, probable cause) in order to track the location 
information of a regular person through GPS technology.118 
Furthermore, as the Court held in Carpenter, probable cause requires 
some level of individualized suspicion based on the facts.119 In In re Oakland, 
one federal court expounded on this, holding that a warrant compelling “any 
individual,” including non-suspects who were simply present at the scene 
covered by the warrant, to unlock their device through biometric measures 
was overbroad because the request was not limited to “a particular person nor 
a particular device.”120 Though the California court made this decision within 
the context of biometric technology, it acknowledged its duty under 
Carpenter to protect individuals’ constitutional rights from technological 
encroachments.121 Courts could apply similar reasoning to overturn reverse 
location search warrants, which can cover every phone in a specific area and 
similarly do not list every individual or device that they are targeting. Reverse 
location search warrants, like the warrant in In re Oakland, are problematic 
because of the way that they capture the location data of innocent people who 
were simply present at the time of a lawful arrest.122 
C. PROBABLE CAUSE ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO REVERSE LOCATION 
SEARCH WARRANTS 
Based on the reasoning in Carpenter and In re Oakland, reverse location 
search warrants put the cart before the horse. The second warrant in a reverse 
location search warrant would likely satisfy the probable cause framework 
established by the Court due to its basis in suspicious location information 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (“GPS monitoring—by making 
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of information about any person 
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, choose to track—may ‘alter the 
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 119 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
 120 In re Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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(quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19). 
 122 Id. 
2021] RETHINKING REVERSE LOCATION SEARCH WARRANTS 827 
trends brought to light through the first warrant. However, the first warrant 
has a much thinner justification. Essentially, to satisfy the test under 
Carpenter, law enforcement officials must make the argument that being 
near a crime scene puts one under enough individualized suspicion to satisfy 
the probable cause requirement even though proximity to a crime scene might 
have nothing to do with criminal activity.123 
This argument is not as far-fetched as it might sound, especially when 
search warrants are narrowly defined. Evidence showing that a stranger’s cell 
phone was inside an apartment within an hour of a murder or theft would 
certainly make many reasonable police officers suspicious about the 
activities of the cell phone’s owner.124 In this way, narrowly defined reverse 
location search warrants can be analogized to traditional warrants for 
individuals seen by eyewitnesses or caught on video camera near the crime 
scene. However, reverse location search warrants authorized for huge areas 
or vast periods of time are much harder to justify. As such, courts should 
push back against overly broad reverse location search warrants to ensure 
that law enforcement acts properly within the probable cause framework. 
In addition to pushing back against broad reverse location search 
warrants, courts should also consider the fact that, perhaps unlike information 
provided in traditional warrants, the GPS information provided by law 
enforcement in reverse search warrants may not be particularly reliable.125 
As the Court stated in Brinegar, part of satisfying probable cause requires a 
judge to evaluate whether the warrant they are authorizing is based on 
“reasonably trustworthy” information.126 The Court simplified this 
requirement in Illinois v. Gates, where it stated, “[t]he task of the issuing 
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth [ . . . ] there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”127 
Reverse location search warrants make this analysis more complicated 
because unaided judges are often ill-suited to the task of evaluating the 
 
 123 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“The Court requires 
‘some quantum of individualized suspicion’ before a search or seizure take place.”). 
 124 Ben Levitan, How Cellphones Help Catch Criminals, CRIME ONLINE (Dec. 29, 2016) 
https://www.crimeonline.com/2016/12/29/cellphones-and-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/HV2
H-P2UP]. 
 125 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 266 (1983) (concurring with the majority and stating 
that courts assume good faith in police officers and should eschew inquiries into the 
“subjective beliefs” of law enforcement); see supra notes 67–68. 
 126 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–176 (1949). 
 127 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
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accuracy of data provided by Google and other location information 
providers.128 
As already explained, the accuracy of Google’s information is far from 
perfect.129 Thus, judges decide whether probable cause exists without 
adequate information about both the size of the targeted area and the accuracy 
of the GPS tracking data that is informing the warrant.130 Additionally, the 
second warrant within a reverse location search warrant is based on the 
results of the first warrant.131 This means that when judges authorize the 
second warrant, they are likely proceeding on the assumption that Google 
provided law enforcement with results accurate enough to be considered 
“reasonably trustworthy.”132 This assumption might be justified because the 
“reasonable” qualifier leaves police officers some room for error in 
requesting warrants.133 Until the technology improves, however, legitimate 
concerns around the trustworthiness of warrants issued based on Google’s 
location information will persist, even when judges find that the warrants 
satisfy probable cause. 
In summary, Fourth Amendment challenges against reverse location 
search warrants are inevitable.134 These challenges might come from an 
originalist perspective based on the similarity between reverse location 
search warrants and general warrants. However, they will likely be primarily 
based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter, with litigants arguing 
that courts may not grant a request to search every mobile device in an area 
because such a request would not be based on individualized suspicion, and 
accordingly, it would not satisfy the Court’s probable cause standard.135 In 
fact, these challenges have already begun. A federal district court in 
Richmond, Virginia is currently preparing to rule on a Fourth Amendment 
challenge against a reverse location search warrant.136 Both defense counsel 
and the government relied on the ruling in Carpenter in the case’s briefing, 
which also included a neutral amicus from Google.137 Defense counsel even 
compared reverse location search warrants and general warrants in their 
briefings, before arguing that the third-party doctrine should not apply to 
 
 128 Webster, supra note 57. 
 129 See supra Part B. 
 130 Webster, supra note 57. 
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 132 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
 133 Id. at 176. 
 134 Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, supra note 8. 
 135 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
 136 Sobel, supra note 27. 
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Google’s location information and stating that reverse location search 
warrants are “invalid ab initio,” or void.138 The outcome of this pending 
litigation will serve as a litmus test for the success of Fourth Amendment 
challenges against reverse location search warrants. 
IV. PROPOSED JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
The traditional probable cause framework might have been appropriate 
at the time it was put forward. But in recent years, the weight of technological 
innovation and changing consumer privacy expectations may have pushed it 
to its limits.139 Reverse location search warrants are especially problematic 
because judges might struggle to assess the probability that warrants will lead 
to evidence based on the information law enforcement provides, especially 
within the limited time judges spend reviewing warrants.140 This Part will 
discuss two potential solutions to this challenge. First, courts can use an 
alternative framework when deciding whether to grant reverse location 
search warrants. Second, federal and state legislatures can adopt three 
legislative proposals that collectively would put judges in a better position to 
decide whether warrants satisfy probable cause. 
A. ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS: A NEW PROBABLE CAUSE 
EXCEPTION 
Though the Fourth Amendment’s language explicitly requires that 
warrants be supported by probable cause,141 there are exceptions to this 
requirement.142 Examples of these exceptions include exigent 
circumstances,143 searches incidental to arrest,144 and hot pursuit.145 In this 
 
 138 See id. In this context, invalid ab initio means void or having no legal effect. 
 139 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. In both 
cases, the Supreme Court elected to create unique carve outs from established doctrine 
partially because of the immense capacities of modern technology, such as cell phones, to 
store users’ personal information. 
 140 Cushing, supra note 56.  
 141 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 142 Clifford Fishman, Searching Cell Phones After Arrest: Exceptions to the Warrant and 
Probable Cause Requirements, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 995, 1003 (2013). 
 143 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (holding that warrants are required 
to search a home unless there are exigent circumstances, such as needing to enter a home in 
order to fight fire or prevent the destruction of evidence). 
 144 Riley, 573 U.S. at 383 (holding that searches incidental to arrest are lawful even 
without a warrant). 
 145 United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (holding that police could make a 
warrantless entry when following a suspect who retreated into her house in order to avoid 
arrest). 
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vein, courts could create a new exception to the probable cause requirement 
to address the unique problems presented by reverse location search 
warrants. Similar to exigent circumstances cases, the court would essentially 
be acknowledging that while reverse location search warrants do not satisfy 
traditional probable cause analysis, in some emergency circumstances they 
might be needed in order to prevent a greater tragedy. One example of a 
situation where the government might argue that their interest in national 
security outweighs constitutional concerns would be in the context of 
terrorist threats.146 
To determine whether the exception applies, courts could perform a 
balancing test for reverse location search warrants. Under this balancing test, 
courts would weigh the government’s need for information in specific, 
emergency circumstances against the risk of violating people’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. This alternative framework follows reasoning similar to 
that used in cases involving “exigent circumstances.”147 The exigent 
circumstances148 exception allows officers to take certain actions, such as 
conducting warrantless searches, that would otherwise be legally suspect, in 
order to protect or preserve lives.149 Google’s policy of providing information 
without a warrant in emergency circumstances shows that even large 
corporations agree that when human life is at imminent risk, privacy concerns 
can become secondary.150 Courts must be cautious in considering whether a 
particular request falls within the exigent circumstances exception in light of 
the constitutional concerns related to warrantless searches.151 They would 
need to be similarly judicious in granting reverse location search warrants for 
this emergency balancing test solution to work. For example, courts would 
need to carefully consider the area surveyed and the context of the warrant 
as well as how pressing law enforcement’s need for information is. 
 
 146 Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of 
Apple, Google, and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), https://www.theguardian.co
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 147 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (holding that in certain emergencies, 
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 148 Exigent circumstances refer to “emergency or dangerous situations,” not just day-to-
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 149 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 150 GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP. HELP CTR., supra note 38. 
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This proposed balancing test framework would allow judges to take the 
purpose of a reverse location search warrant into account when deciding the 
whether to grant it. Law enforcement agencies, however, may not support 
this new approach since it may prevent them from using a valuable tool in 
their arsenal in some circumstances, and courts tend to give great deference 
to law enforcement agencies.152 Courts might also hesitate to propose a 
balancing test because of the additional strain on judicial resources any speed 
bump in the warrant approval process could create.153 Judges must always be 
on call in order to approve warrants, and law enforcement may call in at odd 
hours as needed.154 Indeed, as judges already seem to lack the time or 
resources necessary to spend more than several seconds to review a 
warrant,155 they may be especially reluctant to add a balancing test. Given the 
limitations of a judicial solution, a better solution would be for state and 
federal legislatures to write laws ensuring that reverse location search 
warrants satisfy traditional probable cause analysis. 
B. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
While some state lawmakers may prefer to ban reverse location search 
warrants entirely, as some have already proposed,156 others will likely aim to 
regulate them more closely. For the jurisdictions focused on regulation, there 
are a few common-sense legislative solutions that could significantly 
minimize the reverse location search warrant’s impact on privacy and also 
have a good chance of passing. In today’s polarized political environment, 
cooperation between both parties in state and federal legislatures might seem 
quixotic at best, but consumer privacy expectations are a bipartisan 
 
 152 Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1995, 2052 (2017). 
 153 Jonathan R. Nash, Aiming for Simplicity, the Supreme Court Makes Things More 
Complicated, HILL (July 13, 2016, 9:43 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judic
iary/287520-aiming-for-simplicity-supreme-court-opts-for-complexity [https://perma.cc/QE
B7-3PX7]. 
 154 Dale Harris, A Judges View: Warrants Can’t Wait, so a Judge Always is on Call, 
DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/op
inion/3918552-judges-view-warrants-cant-wait-so-judge-always-call [https://perma.cc/4BD9
-NRA5]. 
 155 Miller, supra note 61. 
 156 In New York, Senator Zellnor Myrie and Assembly Member Dan Quart are pushing 
for the protection of constitutional rights by banning reverse location search warrants entirely 
in their proposed “Reverse Location Search Prohibition Act.” Nicolette J. Zulli, Scaling the 
(Geo)Fence: New York Lawmakers Push to Outlaw Geofence Warrants amid Ongoing 
National Debate for Police Reform, LEXOLOGY (June 19, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/li
brary/detail.aspx?g=3414b576-479a-4ebe-81c9-787ac220767b [https://perma.cc/DS5R-S5M
5]. 
832 RATHI [Vol. 111 
concern.157 Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress continue to draft 
privacy bills addressing the distribution of personal information and the role 
of corporations in protecting consumer privacy.158 In 2019 alone, over 150 
pieces of legislation on data privacy were considered by state legislatures in 
both blue and red states.159 
Thus, it seems possible that some of these legislatures might consider 
including regulations on reverse location search warrants as part of their 
comprehensive data privacy reform bills.160 Furthermore, passing legislation, 
especially at the federal level, would ensure more uniform compliance across 
jurisdictions. This Comment proposes three specific laws that would 
cumulatively limit the reverse location search warrant’s impact on privacy: a 
printed maps requirement, a mandated anonymization process for 
information gained via the first warrant, and a requirement that law 
enforcement erases unnecessary data collected by reverse location search 
warrants.161 
1. Printed Maps Requirement 
The first and simplest legislative proposal would require that all reverse 
location search warrants contain a printed map of the area in question 
alongside GPS coordinates. In order to satisfy a probable cause analysis, the 
warrant must present an area that judges can actually visualize. GPS 
coordinates or written descriptions might be helpful, but they do not provide 
judges with a full picture of the area to which they are granting police access. 
For example, a warrant might say “between the Hilton hotel and the 
intersection on Chicago Avenue” but fail to make note of the large residential 
apartment complex in between those two places. This would be problematic 
because the judge might unknowingly authorize the search of thousands of 
extra mobile devices belonging to people simply going about their day-to-
day lives. A current map printed from Google Earth or any equivalent 
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software could help prevent this problem and lead to fewer people having 
their information needlessly shared with law enforcement. 
Implementing this kind of legislation should be relatively inexpensive, 
as the Trax software used by law enforcement to create reverse location 
warrants already has the capability to create maps using Google Earth.162 In 
fact, law enforcement officers already use the Trax software to map the area 
they are targeting before sending coordinates.163 Law enforcement officials 
would only need to attach a copy of the map they created to the warrant 
before sending it to a judge. This simple legislative measure would allow 
judges to more thoroughly analyze whether a reverse location search warrant 
satisfies probable cause and could prevent police officers from casting too 
wide a net.164 
2. Mandated Anonymization Process for the First Warrant 
A second legislative proposal would require the initial reverse location 
search warrant to be protected by some anonymization process so that law 
enforcement would be unable to trace the location information back to 
individuals without getting judicial approval for a second warrant. Currently, 
Google uses a system of anonymized numbers in place of names when 
providing information in the initial reverse location warrants, which leads to 
a relatively higher degree of privacy for individuals whose sensitive location 
information is shared with law enforcement.165 More detailed account 
information, including the people’s names, is withheld from law enforcement 
officers until they narrow down the list of suspects and request a second 
warrant based on suspicious location history and trends.166 As other tech 
companies expand their ability to collect location information, state and 
federal legislatures should codify Google’s anonymization process to ensure 
that individuals’ location information is adequately protected. 
Limiting police access to personal information could go a long way 
towards curtailing abuses by police officers and information leaks to the 
press. This proposed legislation would also provide a baseline privacy 
standard for smartphone consumers. This concern may become even more 
important as tech companies ramp up their use of location tracking services 
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in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the need for contact tracing.167 
This legislation would also help hold Google accountable if consumer 
privacy becomes less valuable168 to the company in the future.169 Finally, 
keeping personal information anonymous during the initial warrant would 
also help ensure that reverse location search warrants satisfy probable cause 
analysis. This is because with anonymization, the initial warrant would only 
authorize a very limited release of data to law enforcement on the basis of 
being near a crime scene. 
3. Erasing Unnecessary Data Collected by Reverse Location Search 
Warrants 
A third and final legislative proposal would require that police 
departments dispose of unneeded information (location-related or otherwise) 
derived from reverse location search warrants after the investigation is 
considered closed. Currently, police departments nationwide may keep data 
pulled from sources such as reverse location search warrants in their archives 
indefinitely.170 This practice may make sense for information derived from 
traditional search warrants because everyone implicated in those warrants 
likely at least satisfied the probable cause analysis. Reverse location search 
warrants, however, can contain the location information of many more 
innocent people than traditional warrants, especially in metropolitan areas.171 
This information is not easily accessible to the public through Freedom of 
Information Act requests,172 but information held by law enforcement could 
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be leaked to the media,173 collected by hackers,174 or used by nefarious police 
officers175 despite arguably having been collected without probable cause. 
Law enforcement agencies will likely push back against regulations that 
require them to destroy location information.176 They might argue that 
compiling large amounts of data across different agencies can help police 
officers better solve crimes as their departments’ data analytics capabilities 
grow more powerful.177 Indeed, law enforcement officials have successfully 
made similar arguments regarding DNA databases.178 Though courts have 
been willing to consider privacy concerns in the DNA context, they have 
historically given great deference to the state’s public interest in catching 
criminals.179 
Unlike DNA databases, however, reverse location search warrants 
provide law enforcement agencies with location information about innocent 
citizens that officers can immediately use without needing to send anything 
to a lab. This information could include a person’s name, workplace, or home 
address. Malicious police officers or any third party could more easily abuse 
location information in comparison to DNA evidence because they can use 
location information to easily identify an individual and find where they live. 
On the other hand, while DNA provides very sensitive information, it 
requires translation by scientists in order for a lay person to understand. 
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Law enforcement officials might also argue that requiring the careful 
deletion of location information might be logistically difficult and expensive. 
For example, even after the case is officially closed, it may prove challenging 
for law enforcement agencies to draw the line between truly unnecessary 
information and slightly suspicious information that has potential relevance 
in case the investigation is reopened. Furthermore, it might be cost 
prohibitive for government officers to audit how often law enforcement 
officers are deleting extraneous information collected by reverse location 
search warrants. That being said, requiring police officers to delete 
unnecessary information collected by the first warrant in a reverse location 
search warrant would go a long way towards assuaging some of the 
fundamental privacy concerns citizens might have with the technology. 
Taken together, all three legislative measures proposed by this Comment 
would help combat the potential dangers to privacy presented by the 
widespread adoption of reverse location search warrants. 
CONCLUSION 
The reverse location search warrant is a powerful new technology 
capable of both making our lives safer and pushing us further towards all-
pervasive government surveillance. As local police departments continue to 
adopt and refine this new tool and tech companies expand their capabilities 
for storing consumer location information, citizens’ Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from searches without probable cause requires further protections. 
These protections could come at least in part from the courts, which have 
strained to adapt the probable cause framework to new technological 
developments. In lieu of judicial action, however, federal and state 
legislatures must create new laws to help judges better analyze whether 
warrants satisfy probable cause in order to protect innocent people from 
having their location information shared with police officers or even with the 
public at large. 
The three laws proposed by this paper simply represent a starting point 
for protecting American citizens from reverse location search warrants. They 
would help assuage some of the practical and constitutional difficulties that 
these new warrants present. However, as more data is collected around the 
accuracy and effectiveness of reverse location search warrants, legislators 
will likely need to consider more specific laws and regulations in order to 
protect fundamental privacy concerns. These more technologically 
sophisticated solutions might include mandated support staff for police 
departments opting to use reverse location search warrants or proof of 
accuracy benchmarks before tech companies may provide police officers 
with location information in criminal cases. As a society, we seem to be 
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inching closer and closer towards a surveillance state. Still, reverse location 
search warrants are likely a necessary evil to help law enforcement officials 
keep in lockstep with tech-savvy criminals. Through the use of alternate legal 
frameworks, common-sense legislative protections, and careful approval of 
warrants, however, we can curtail the privacy impact of the reverse location 
search warrant. 
 
